The latest trend in customer loyalty and brand value is the creation of the Limited Edition gift card. Currently, consumers can purchase the gift card for the value of the card. When the value is depleted, the gift card is theirs to keep. The retention by the consumer of the commemorative card is associated with a positive perspective on the client.

Recently, the Texaco Company has begun selling what it calls commemorative gift cards, featuring the image of Juan Pablo Montoya on the cards and touting it as a limited edition card. Currently, the special edition card costs no extra.

Some state laws forbid the charging of a sizeable premium for a gift card. This new twist, however, paves the way for companies to recoup any losses they may rack up in the creation of the cards themselves. So long as the card is legally a “limited edition,” and there is some real value associated with collecting the card, companies may start trying to push the envelope with regard to charging a premium for gift cards. It appears that the “free drinking glass with fill-up” days are long over.

Last Wednesday, Johnson & Johnson filed suit against the Red Cross, alleging trademark infringement of J&J’s RED CROSS design by the Red Cross for products licensed by the Red Cross and sold to the public.

J&J doesn’t appear to dispute the Red Cross’ use of the mark for disaster preparedness, but claims that its use cannot extend to commercially available products, such as first aid kits, something J&J has been selling since at least as early as 1903 (and possibly 1887). J&J claims that the 1900 Charter by Congress did not give the Red Cross the right to sell commercial products. The Red Cross, on the other hand, points to language in the Charter that allowed it to register its emblem (red cross on a white background) in every class at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, as well as language in the Charter that allows it to carry out other activities consistent with its Charter purposes. Supplying the public with various products related to safety, the Red Cross contends, is completely within the course and scope of its mandate and the Charter. Such a position is making J&J see red.

If the Red Cross’ public information is correct and it has for 100-plus years been selling first aid kits for over 100 years openly, and with the knowledge of J&J, this writer thinks a laches defense might well carry the day. If J&J leaps that hurdle, then perhaps a showing of lack of confusion for the past 100 years is sufficient to quiet the company. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. 191 F. 3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999)Surely, the proliferation of third party “cross” marks, coupled with both entities’ longstanding histories has over time educated consumers to the distinction between the two marks’ use. Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fedl. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. 651 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1981); Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Handy Boys, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1156 (TTAB 1990).

Despite the fact that the marks are identical, it’s not difficult to tell the difference when we are presented with each; much like pornography, we know which is which when we see it. What is likely making J&J see red is the potential loss of market share rather than any real concern of confusion. And here we thought trademarks were for consumer protection.

WB Music Corp v. RTV Communications Group, Inc. 445 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2006)

In 7 separate CD products, RTV copied and distributed unauthorized copies of WB Music’s copyrights in 13 musical works. The trial court held that the infringement was willful and granted statutory damages for 7 infringments.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and awarded 13 infringements. The damage calculation was properly the works taken not the works produced.

Roberts v. Keith 79 USPQ 2d 1368 (SDNY 2006)

This is a case of disclosure; biding one’s time; and that biding being seen as a fraud that tolled the three year statute of limitations.

Roberts wrote songs in 1976 and 1977 and showed them to Keith who stated that he had no interest in those works.

In 1980, Keith released the songs; and between 1997 - 2001, Keith’s song was re-released repeatedly in compilations.

Roberts sued Keith in 2003 for copyright infringement; and, Keith defended that the statute of limitations barred all infringements prior to 1999.

Court held that the Statute of Limitations was tolled by the fraud of Keith. Motion of dismiss on statute of limitations denied; case going forward.

Gilpin v. Siebert 419 F. Supp 2d 1288 (D. Or. 2006)

Bernadine Gilpin was an employee of the Portland Community College as a counselor. With another college employee, Al Gilpin, she co-authored a book, “College Survival and Success”.

In a copyright infringement action between the two authors, summary judgement was denied because there was insufficient evidence on whether the Work Made For Hire doctrine applied. The court noted that the record was insufficient to determine the following:
-whether the writing was incidental to job duties;
-whether work was created inside or outside the authorized work hours;
-whether the the writing was within her job description;
-whether the writing was written with the intent to benefit the college; and,
-whether the writing was inspired by or derivative to her work experience.

A veritable paint-by-numbers for a professor to own a copyright, it is.

Pritchett v. Pound No. 05-41445 December 18, 2006 (5th Cir)

Pound was an employee of Pritchett; and his employment agreement/ job description included that he would be“completing regular written
assignments and the development of new products and procedures;” and that “[s]hould the Employee produce any written materials in the course of
his work with the Employer, then such shall be done for and on behalf of the Employer and all work produced shall be the exclusive property of the Employer.”

While still employed in 1988 and 1989, Pound co-authored two books which Pritchett both filed for copyright applications at the United States Copyright Office, and published and sold successfully.

When completing the copyright application, Pritchett erroneously checked “NO” in response to the question, “Is this a Work Made For Hire?”; and went on to identify Pound as an “author” on that form. The copyright applications resulted in registrations; and an effort to correct that error at the Copyright Office was blundered in 1990.

In 1995, Pound died. Pritchett was generous in accomodating the widow including paying the entire one million dollar bonus that year even though Pound had only worked one quarter of that year.

In 2002, Pound’s widow sued Pritchett as a joint author demanding an accounting and damages.

Pritchett defended that Pound was not an author, and that the Work Made For Hire doctrine trumped the errors in the copyright application.

The Fifth Circuit agrees with Pritchett stating that a more clear agreement of the parties was needed to change the status of Work Made For Hire. The error in the copyright application was not substantive or effective in changing ownership.

Faessler v. United States Playing Card Co 1:05-cv-00581; U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio

Michael Faessler was a cadet at the United States Military Academy when he composed a playing card set modeled on the military ranking system (lowest rank correlates to lowest card and so on). Faeseller registered his set with the United States Copyright Office; offered to sell the cards through the military commissaries but was declined that opportunity.

Upon learning that his identical card sets were being manufactured, and distributed by the military commissary, Faessler sued.

Two of the defenses raised were that there is no copyright in the set; and that the location of copyright notice solely on the joker card and not on any of the other cards caused any copyright to be forfeit and the work in the public domain.

The trial court held that the copyright in the set is valid and enforceable; and that the notice on the joker card alone is sufficient.

Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publishing 2007 WL 443048
In what is becoming a normative complicated and attenuated set of facts for a renewal case, this case involves whether the renewal of Roger Miller’s 1958 - 1964 music was timely.

Mary Miller, the widow of Roger, sued Sony for copyright infringement asserting that the Roger Miller estate and not Sony owned the renewal rights. Key to the complicated set of facts is that Sony filed the renewal documents on behalf of Miller personally in the twenty eighth year, before Miller died later in that same twenty eighth year.

This tee-ed up the question simply as: can a copyright renewal term vest before the renewal term begins?

The issue is further complicated because these pre-1978 musical works are now governed by the 1998 Bono Copyright Extension Act which states:

Section 304(c)(2)(A) At the expiration of the original term of copyright in a work specified in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, the copyright shall endure for a renewed and extended further term of 67 years, which —

(i) if an application to register a claim to such further term has been made to the Copyright Office within 1 year before the expiration of the original term of copyright, and the claim is registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in the proprietor of the copyright who is entitled to claim the renewal of copyright at the time the application is made; or

(ii) if no such application is made or the claim pursuant to such application is not registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in the person or entity that was the proprietor of the copyright as of the last day of the original term of copyright.

The trial court ruled that because Roger Miller was alive at the time that Sony filed the renewal, the renewal rights went to Sony.

The renewal rights of the pre-1978 works are proving to be valuable; and the courts are giving us more guidance on when and how the timing of the renewal dance works. More proof that copyrights are economically vibrant, still.

Tenn. Walking Horse v. Nat’l. Walking Horse 2007 WL 325774 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 2007)

Out of Tennessee, we learn that facts about horses that are selected, arranged and organized in a registry are copyrightable.

Here are the facts: The Tennessee Walking Horses Breeders Association of America (TW) has been keeping a registry since 1935 which keeps the details of just under half a million horses’ pedigree and related information such as identifying details, unusual markings and legacy data.

In part precipitated by the controversy over ’soring’ the Tennessee Walking Horse, a separate association, The National Walking Horse Association, (NWHA) was formed in 1998 to promote the breeding of that specific horse breed without the training technique called ’soring’ that makes the horse lift their feet in the archetypal manner of that breed. In July of 2004, the NWHA rolled out a registry that was to be analogous, but separate from the TW registry.

TW obtained a copyright registration for its registry; and, filed a copyright infringement action against the NWHA alledging that the NWHA registry infringes the TW registry compilation copyright. TW’s summary judgment motion details that their registry comprises facts that are specifically selected, organized and arranged, including unique colors and combinations, markings, identifiers and abbreviations. (“blaze lower lip, sock left hind leg,
fetlock right hind leg”).

Judge Todd Campbell, of the Tennessee federal trial court ruled, in January of 2007, that the copyright registration is valid and that NWHA’s copying constituted copyright infringement. The court discarded the NWHA’s defense that that the small facts of that were used were ‘de minimis’.

Or at least you should be. On February 2, 2007, Cheryl Bentley sued Donald Trump and the creators of the NBC television series The Apprentice for allegedly creating an illegal lottery in the state of Georgia.

The “Get Rich With Trump” sweepstakes is a watch-and-win promotion where entrants watch the television show and, at the prompting of the announcer, text in which Apprentice contestant should be sent to “Tent City.” The rules state that in addition to any mobile phone text charges that may apply, Sponsor will charge entrant a $.99 “premium” charge per text entry. The rules also allow for a free method of entry online.

Perhaps the sweepstakes attorney who vetted this promotion should be sent to Tent City instead. Many states carry laws on their books that clearly state that a free method of entry does not cure an otherwise illegal lottery. If the pay-to-play method of entry does not provide the entrant with something equal in value to what was paid, the lottery is still illegal. In this case, an entrant gets no more for its money that does an entrant who chooses to use the Internet entry method.